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A central question in political science is how to best manage information asym-
metries and commitment problems when disputes arise between states or nations.
We argue that common framings of this problem miss an important feature: the in-
stitutions determining how disputes are resolved shape the incentives for nations to
enter disputes. Because war can be sometimes understood as the down-side risk from
entering a dispute, institutions that reduce the chances of war-fighting may induce
perverse incentives to enter into disputes and militarize. We develop a simple crisis
model that captures both the militarization decisions and bargaining behavior. We
examine how features like direct communication and third-party involvement alter
the incentives. Seemingly effective institutions that improve the chance of peace for
a given distribution of military strength, can actually lower the chance of peace once
one accounts for distortions to militarization decisions. To illustrate the value of this
broader perspective we show how a form of intervention by a mediator concerned
only with resolving the current crisis, turns out to create optimal militarization and
bargaining incentives.
∗Princeton University, Department of Politics.
†Columbia University, Departments of Political Science and Economics.
‡Princeton University, Department of Politics.
§Warwick University, Department of Economics.
1
1 Introduction
A central question in politics is how institutions shape political decision-making and policy
outcomes. The study of institutions that are used resolve disputes which might devolve
into military conflict is central to the field of international relations. The types of disagree-
ments studied range from international disputes to civil and ethnic conflicts. Moreover, an
important portion of this work seeks to make policy-relevant pronouncements about how
particular institutional features affect the likelihood that fighting will break out.
For example, a growing body of theoretical work considers how various forms of direct
diplomacy can influence the probability of bargaining breakdown (Baliga and Sjöström
2004, Ramsay 2011, Smith 1998, Sartori 2002, Traeger 2011). Others explore the role of
mediation and delineate conditions where such third party actions can influence outcomes
(Bester and Wärneryd 2006, Fey and Ramsay 2010, Horner, Morelli, and Squintani 2010,
Kydd 2003). Still others look at how standing institutions, like the United Nations or
ICJ, can influence state actions and the probability of cooperation (Fang 2010, Chapman
and Wolford 2010, Gilligan, Johns, and Rosendorf 2010). Similarly, there exists a detailed
empirical literature on mediation and third party intervention. Rauchhaus (2006) pro-
vides quantitative analysis showing that mediation is especially effective when it targets
asymmetric information and Savun (2008) shows that hard sources of information are very
influential. Bercovitch and Houston (2000), and Bercovitch et al. (1991), also point out
the particular relevance of mediation for peace outcomes when the uncertainty about the
disputants’ strength is high.1 Related empirical research on various forms of third party
intervention, such as Dixon (1996) and Frazier and Dixon (2006), finds that mediation can
be effective at increasing the probability of settlement and de-escalation of disputes.
Common to all these studies is the idea that features of the institution within which
the leaders of opposing sides bargain can have important consequences for the likelihood of
peace, the terms of the settlement, and whether the settlement is enduring. Furthermore,
each of these studies takes the crisis as the relevant starting point and is typically focused on
1More generally, for an overview of the literature on effective forms of negotiations, with and without
mediators, see Bercovich and Jackson (2001), Wall and Lynn, (1993).
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what might be called the crisis specific incentives. Scholars framing the problem in this way
ask questions like: given a dispute, how will the features of the institution–say commitment,
information transmission, the presence of a mediator, external motivations, an audience,
trade spillovers –influence the likely resolution? Following this analysis scholars prescribe
what they take to be the best combination of institutional features to resolve the disputes
that emerge. In this paper we argue that, because institutions can influence the ways that a
given dispute is resolved, they can also have important effects on the types of disputes that
emerge. Intuitively, a bloody, costly or wasteful conflict can be understood as the possible
‘punishment’ for militarizing and entering a dispute in the first place. Hence, institutions
that minimize the chances that disputes lead to conflict may lead to more militarization
and disputes. Although this summary is accurate it is still too simple. It is not sufficient
to think about whether institutional features increase the risk of equilibrium bargaining
failure and war. A proper study must account for how features change the likelihood that
different configurations of capacity result in war. The payoff to our theoretical approach is
that it offers a framework to handle these nuanced considerations.
We show that failures to account for the possible upstream connections between dispute
resolution and militarization incentives may lead scholars to get the relationships between
institutions and conflict backwards and can result in policy prescriptions that increase the
likelihood of conflict, not decrease it. Specifically, some celebrated institutions such as
unmediated peace talks that reduce conflict in the short-run actually raise the probability
of war by changing incentives to militarize, and thus the type of crises that arise. This
paper pushes for a reformulation of the study of conflict and institutional design and draws
a finer distinction between different ways of fostering peace for a given crisis; some are also
beneficial at reducing militarization while others generate offsetting negative incentives.
To flesh out the relevance of militarization incentives, and the potential tradeoffs in-
volved across dispute settlement mechanisms, we consider a simple setting in which two
nations decide whether to become strong by investing in military capabilities. These de-
cisions are not publicly observed and the choice to become strong involves paying a cost.
After the investment decisions are made the players bargain over the division of a prize
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where bargaining failure leads to war. In this game each side makes a demand and if the
demands are compatible–i.e., the sum of their demands is less than the size of the pie–the
settlement that splits the difference between the two demands is implemented. If, on the
other hand, the demands are not compatible, the nations fight.
This bargaining game is canonical and serves as a useful benchmark.2 To study how
institutional changes can influence militarization incentives, we first investigate the effects
of adding a pre-play cheap-talk stage to the bargaining game. In this version, after the
nations arm, but before they make their demands, they have the opportunity to meet
and conduct direct diplomacy. The peace talks serve two purposes: first, the delegates
of the nations have the opportunity to share information regarding their arming decisions
and whether they are ”strong” or ”weak.” The information relayed by the delegates is
unverifiable and costless. Second, the meetings may also allow the nations to coordinate
future play: with some probability the meeting is successful and yields a peaceful resolution
of the dispute, otherwise the conflict escalates, ultimately leading to war.
As has been shown e.g. in Baliga and Sjöström (2004), the addition of this type of cheap-
talk stage can be consequential in crisis bargaining. For a fixed probability that each nation
has armed, the model with cheap talk can result in a strictly lower probability of war than
the model without cheap-talk. This fact is shows that institutions can shape the short-run
incentives to fight. Most importantly, we find that, in some circumstances, the anticipation
that bilateral peace talks will occur in a crisis raises the incentives to arm, because this
pre-crisis diplomacy is effective in improving the chances of a peaceful resolution of conflicts
involving strong nations. As a result, the bilateral peace talks reduce the down-side risk
from arming, and thus increase the incentives to arm. The equilibrium of the cheap talk
extension of our bargaining game with strategic militarization also has a higher ex ante
probability of war than the equilibrium that is played when there is no communication
during bargaining. In other words, the affects on strategic militarization trump the gain in
odds that players of particular strengths will negotiate a peaceful settlement.
2The game is purposely simple, but captures key tradeoffs and is sufficiently tractable to allow for
extensions to consider how cheap-talk communication and third party intervention influence the short-run
and long-run incentives.
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To provide a fuller account of how institutions and militarization incentives interact we
contrast the way that cheap-talk communication helps resolve conflict with an alternative
institution, the introduction of a third-party with a mandate to facilitate a peaceful set-
tlement. Such an intervention can have very different effects on the long-run incentives.
Although cheap-talk and dispute resolution by a mediator with no private information or
means to provide incentives are both in principle aimed at allowing for information sharing,
it turns out that the ways these processes foster information transmission can create decid-
edly different militarization incentives. We find that a third-party facilitating negotiations
can broker peace while avoiding the perverse militarization incentives that surface when
deals are reached through direct communication. Interestingly, this is despite the fact that
we do not allow the third party’s mandate to include imposing costs on nations or control
of the militarization incentives. In our framing we conceive of a mediator motivated only
to do the best she can at brokering a settlement of the dispute at hand–one for which the
militarization decisions have already been made, when the third party is called to mediate
the dispute. Even in this “worst-case scenario” of a third-party with no information, or
resources and a narrow mandate, conflicts can be better resolved without increasing the
upstream incentive to arm.
Our results are also related to the study of contests in economics. In this literature it
has become common to model militarization as a contest, (see Garfinkel and Skaperdas,
1996, for a survey). Here strategic militarization is treated as an arms race to prepare
for a sure conflict and the military capacities of each country influence the war-payoffs
through a contest function. For us, militarization increases the expected payoff to fighting
in a crisis, but the goal is expected utility maximization in a game in which war is not a
foregone conclusion. Players may reach a settlement or fight and the militarization choice
can have strategic affects on settlements as well as the odds of fighting. There is a recent
body of formal theory on endogenous militarization in the shadow of bargaining and war
fighting. Meirowitz and Sartori (2008) connect militarization with bargaining behavior but
provide only results on the impossibility of avoiding conflict. They do not study optimal
mechanisms or make comparisons across different institutions. Jackson and Morelli (2009)
consider militarization and war but in their analysis states observe each other’s investment
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decisions prior to bargaining and thus there is no room for communication of any kind to
solve information problems. Akcay, Meirowitz and Ramsay (2012) study investment that
influences the value of agreement for one player and disagreement for the other prior to the
play of a mechanism and provide a characterization of the equilibrium relationship between
the probability of bargaining failure and investment levels. In that paper, however, the
investments are over a private value component whereas here investment by either player
influences the payoffs of both players.
In a less closely connected literature observable armament are viewed as a deterrent or
a signal. Garfinkel (1990) focuses on a simple repeated armament setting that illustrates
this role, and Powell (1993) provides an example of the conditions under which endoge-
nous armament can lead to effective deterrence, in a world of perfect information. Fearon
(1997) argues that observed military expenditures can be a form of costly signaling. Collier
and Hoffler (2006) consider the signaling and deterrent effects of armaments as competing
mechanisms explaining levels of post-conflict military expenditures in countries recently
experiencing a civil war. Chassang and Padro (2008) show that while weapons have de-
terrence effects under complete information in a repeated game, when adding strategic
uncertainty it is no longer true that there is a monotonic relationship between the size of
an arsenal and the degree of deterrence in equilibrium. For very different reasons, even in
our model the effects of endogenous militarization incentives on peace are non-monotonic.
2 Unmediated Peace Talks and Militarization
In this section we develop the baseline model and augment it to allow for unmediated
communication. The analysis focuses on the comparison of these structures and shows
that unmediated peace talks may breed perverse incentives for militarization. Unmediated
talks help resolve disputes by allowing for settlements that would not otherwise be possible
when the nations are strong. But this feature of what cheap talk does to expectations of
how bargaining will unfold, increases the incentive to become strong. We then show that
for some model parameters, unmediated peace talks can increase the overall war probability
when militarization decisions are taken into account.
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The Crisis Bargaining Game Two players, A and B, dispute a prize or pie normalized
to unit size. If no settlement is reached the disputants fight. We adopt the simple bargaining
model with private information to describe how players negotiate over the prize. The game
is also called the Nash demand game (see, e.g. Nash, 1953, and Matthews and Postlewaite,
1989).3 When players bargain they simultaneously make demands xA and xB both in [0, 1].
So like giving a diplomat a set of instructions to “. . . bring back at least a share −−,”
players chose a bargaining strategy that will influence both the settlement (if reached) and
the probability of war. We assume that if one player’s demands are sufficiently generous
to accommodate the minimal demands of the other, i.e., if the sum of the demands is less
than 1, then the split that emerges from bargaining gives each disputant her demand and
half the surplus. If the demands xA and xB are incompatible, meaning they sum to more
than the whole prize, then no split is feasible and the outcome is war.4
War is treated as a lottery which shrinks the value of the pie to θ < 1 but the odds of
winning a war depend on the configuration of arming decisions. Each player can possess
one of two possible arming levels, H or L. We will often refer to type H as a “hawk” and
to a L type as a “dove”. We will describe the process by which nations select their arming
levels subsequently. When the two players are of the same type, each wins the war with
probability 1/2. When a type H player fights against a L type, her probability of winning
is p > 1/2, and hence her expected payoff is pθ, which we assume to be larger than 1/2,
otherwise the dispute can be trivially resolved by agreeing to split the pie in half. In the
case of different types fighting the expected payoff to the L type is (1 − p)θ. Note that
whether or not country A is type H or L influences country B’s payoff from fighting, hence
we are in a context of “interdependent values”.
In the initial militarization stage, A and B each decide whether to remain doves or
to arm and become hawks at a cost k > 0. We characterize a mixed arming strategy by
q ∈ [0, 1], the probability of arming and becoming a hawk. The militarization decisions
are treated as hidden actions, so neither player observes the choice of the other nation,
3Wittman (2009) and Ramsay (2011) use the same bargaining game in their studies of crisis bargaining.
4In the economics literature this protocol is also sometimes called the 12− double auction because the
surplus is divided equally.
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but in an equilibrium the nations hold correct conjectures of the equilibrium strategy-and
thus they know the probability that their opponent has armed. For simplicity, and given
the symmetry of the game, we restrict attention to equilibria that are symmetric in the
militarization strategies q.
When comparing outcomes under different institutions our welfare analysis will focus
on three measures: the equilibrium militarization probability of a country q, the probability
of peaceful conflict resolution V, and the utilitarian ex-ante welfare W = θ(1 − V ) + V −
2kq. Before presenting our results, we define the parameter γ ≡ [pθ − 1/2]/[1/2 − θ/2],
representing the ratio of benefits over cost of war for a hawk: the numerator is the gain for
waging war against a dove instead of accepting the equal split, and the denominator is the
loss for waging war against a hawk rather than accepting equal split. It subsumes the two
parameters θ and p in a single parameter, and allows a more parsimonious representation
of the results. To simplify the exposition, we will henceforth assume that γ ≥ 1, i.e., the
benefit of war for a hawk is sufficiently high relative to the cost. In terms of the deep
parameters, θ and p, this is equivalent to assuming that war is not too destructive and that
the hawk’s advantage over the dove is significant. But one of our main results (Theorem
1) also holds for γ < 1, as explained in the Appendix. In the formal proofs, as we show in
the Appendix, it is often convenient to work with the odd ratio λ = q/ (1− q) associated
with the arming probability q, instead of working with q.
Benchmark equilibrium in the crisis bargaining game Let us start by solving the
crisis bargaining game when q is fixed. This game is characterized by broad equilibrium
multiplicity. For example, any demand strictly larger than 1− (1− p)θ leads to war with
probability one. This claim is so excessive that even a dove knowing that the opponent is
stronger would prefer to fight rather than making such a drastic concession. As a result,
there always exists an equilibrium in which war occurs with probability one in the bench-
mark game. In these equilibria the demands of both types of both players are larger than
1− (1− p) θ; i.e., in this equilibrium the players always coordinate on war.
Given this multiplicity, we restrict attention to equilibria in which, once the dispute has
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arisen, the disputants coordinate on the equilibrium of the crisis bargaining game which
maximizes the chances of peaceful resolution.5
Proposition 1 finds the equilibrium of the crisis bargaining game that maximizes the
peace probability V, given any arming strategy q. Then, we find the equilibrium arming
strategy q in the overall game without communication, given the solution of the crisis
bargaining game from Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The optimal equilibrium of the crisis bargaining game, as a function of the
arming probability q is as follows. For q ≥ γ/ (γ + 1) , the players always achieve peace,
by playing xA = xB = 1/2. For γ/ (γ + 1) > q ≥ γ/ (γ + 2) , peace is achieved unless
both disputants are hawks; hawk players demand xH ∈ [pθ, 1− (1− p) θ] and dove players
demand xL = 1−xH . For q < γ/ (γ + 2) , peace is achieved only if both disputants are doves,
the demand of doves is xL = 1/2, whereas hawks trigger war by demanding xH > 1/2.
This result has fairly natural intuition. When q is large, each player anticipates that
the opponent is likely a hawk. If the opponent plays xj = 1/2 regardless of her type, then
player i can secure the payoff 1/2, by also playing xi = 1/2. Because the opponent is likely
a hawk, even a hawk prefers to induce this known payoff, rather than triggering war by
making a claim larger than 1/2. (Of course, this is true a fortiori for a dove). In fact, the
condition q ≥ γ/ (γ + 1) corresponds to the inequality 1/2 ≥ qθ/2 + (1− q) pθ, where the
right hand side is the expected war payoff of a hawk. In this region of high q one could say
that the idea of peace by deterrence is supported.
When q < γ/ (γ + 1) , hawks will trigger war, unless they expect the opponent to make
demands below 1/2. Because the game is symmetric, this implies that peace cannot be
achieved when both players are hawks. But doves are less willing to trigger war, and would
accept an unequal split to avoid fighting a hawk. Hence it is possible to achieve peace in
hawk-dove player dyads, unless the chance q that the opponent is hawk is too small. The
5Our choice of this selection criterion as opposed to one that minimizes the probability of war inclusive
of arming decisions is motivated by the observation that before the initial, and possibly long, process of
militarization, the disputants are unlikely capable to form commitments on how to play in the bargaining
game, so as to achieve the equilibrium that is optimal in the whole game. Instead, when the crisis erupts,
they will attempt to coordinate on the equilibrium that minimizes the chances of a destructive war.
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demands xH ∈ [pθ, 1− (1− p) θ] and xL = 1 − xH induce equal split among doves, and
make sure that neither a hawk nor a dove player wants to deviate and trigger war. In this
intermediate range of values of q we have only wars between hawks.
When q < γ/ (γ + 2) , even doves are unwilling to accept unequal splits: the optimal
equilibrium is such that xA = xB = 1/2, and peace is achieved only by dove dyads and
peace by deterrence is not a feature of the equilibrium. In summary, when treating the
level of militarization q as an exogenous parameter, the probability of peace is increasing
in q (weakly) for any type of pair, but this monotonic deterrence effect will be significantly
altered when militarization is endogenized.
Having determined the optimal equilibrium of the crisis bargaining game, we can move
one step back and calculate the equilibrium arming strategy q. Note that for intermediate
values of q many demands by the hawk are consistent with equilibrium. We select the one
least favorable to the hawk; i.e., the one with xH = pθ. This is the natural choice as it
minimizes the incentive for militarization among the equilibria listed in Proposition 1 and
thus is the selection that first minimize the risk of war for a given conflict and then among
this set of equilibria which all induce the same probability of war for a given conflict this
one minimizes the risk of war in the larger game. This selection also simplifies the proof
of the main claim in this section, that unmediated cheap talk may increase militarization
incentives. Our characterization will depend on whether the cost of arming, k, is larger than
the critical threshold k∗ ≡ [(1− θ) γ2] /[2 (γ + 1)]. Through out we focus the presentation
on the case that k is smaller than k̄ ≡ [(1− θ) γ (γ + 1)]/[2 (γ + 2)], as this greatly simplifies
the exposition without affecting the insights that come out of the analysis.6
Proposition 2 Assume that the cost of arming k is smaller than k̄. Given the solution in
Proposition 1 with xH = pθ when γ/ (γ + 1) > q ≥ γ/ (γ + 2) , the equilibrium of the game
with endogenous militarization that maximizes welfare is as follows.
1. For k ∈ [0, k∗), the disputants cannot improve on the grim outcome in which they
6We limit attention to the parameter space with k ≤ k̄ because it is the most interesting region of
parameters, where the most surprising results obtain, but the full characterization of equilibrium for the
remaining range of high costs of militarization is available upon request. Importantly, k∗ < k̄.
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both arm with probability q = 1, and then fight;




, each disputant militarizes with probability q (k) = γ−2k/(1−θ), and
only hawk dyads fight.
For small costs of militarization, i.e., when k < k∗, the players cannot improve on the
grim outcome: they arm and fight. Indeed, fighting is always an equilibrium of the crisis
bargaining game. For small costs of militarization, players prefer to arm in anticipation of a
fight, rather than saving the militarization cost and losing the war. In fact, the disputants
are unable to commit to remain unarmed and peaceful, or even to randomize. Because
the cost of arming is small, each disputant would have an incentive to deviate, arm and





the disputants neither strictly prefer to remain peaceful, nor to militarize. Indeed, they
randomize at the militarization stage, to then fight if and only if they both armed. Not
surprisingly, the arming probability decreases as the cost of militarization increases, to
reach q = γ/ (γ + 2) for k = k̄.7
Unmediated Peace Talks We now augment the game by adding an extra intermediate
stage. We assume that after the militarization stage, but before playing the crisis bargaining
game, direct bilateral peace talks take place. At this stage the two players simultaneously
send unverifiable messages mi ∈ {l, h}, i = A,B, to each other. For simplicity, we assume
that only one round of communication takes place. But to broaden the scope and capabili-
ties of bilateral peace talks, we allow players to make use of a randomization device, whose
realization is observed by both disputants. This modeling strategy is less esoteric than
it might seem. Aside from capturing literal publicly observe random events that players
could condition their behavior on, it is known that public randomization devices can be
reconstructed as simultaneous cheap talk (see, e.g. Aumann and Hart, 2003). By allowing
for public randomization devices we are ensuring that the logic of our result holds for a
large class of models of communication (albeit in a reduced form way). So, in our model,
7The equilibrium characterization changes discontinuously for k > k̄, because, once the dispute has
arisen, players fight unless they are both doves.
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the disputants can coordinate on different equilibria of the crisis bargaining game, as a
function of both their messages, and of the realization of the public randomization device.
Our model then provides a simple framework to represent meetings in which the dis-
putants conduct unmediated talks, share information and attempt to coordinate future
play. Any equilibrium has the following form: with some probability, the meetings will be
successful, and the disputants will agree on a peaceful resolution. With complementary
probability, the peace talk meetings will fail, and lead to open conflict. In any equilibrium
in which information is meaningfully revealed the probability that the meeting results in a
peaceful resolution will depend on their type dyad, as we detail below in Proposition 3.
In order to show that unmediated peace talks may strictly reduce the probability of
peace and welfare, it is sufficient to find equilibria of the augmented game that induce
higher militarization and war probability than the equilibria described in Proposition 2 for
some values of the parameters. Our equilibrium selection criterion will focus again on the
equilibrium that maximizes the peace probability V, given any arming strategy q, in which
disputants adopt a pure strategy when declaring their types. 8 The characterization of this
equilibrium is in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 For any given militarization strategy q, the optimal pure strategy equilib-
rium of the crisis bargaining game with bilateral peace talks is characterized by two param-
eters, pH , pM and has the following form. Each type truthfully reveals her type during peace
talks. Then, hawk dyads (H,H) coordinate on the peaceful demands xA = 1/2, xB = 1/2
with probability pH , and fight with probability 1− pH ; asymmetric dyads (H,L) coordinate
on the peaceful demands (pθ, 1− pθ) with probability pM , and fight with probability 1− pM
— the case for (L,H) is symmetric; and dove dyads (L,L) achieve peace with probability
one, making demands xA = 1/2, xB = 1/2.
Specifically, when q < γ/(γ + 2), pH = 0 and pM ∈ (0, 1) ; whereas when γ/(γ + 2) ≤ q <
γ/(γ + 1), pM = 1 and pH ∈ (0, 1) ; finally, when q ≥ γ/(γ + 1), pM = 1 and pH = 1.
Whenever q < γ/(γ+ 1), unmediated cheap talk strictly improves the peace chance, for any
8Again, the motivation is that, when the crisis erupts, disputants will attempt to coordinate on the
equilibrium that minimizes the chances of a destructive war.
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given militarization strategy q.
The equilibrium in Proposition 3 is best illustrated by comparing it to the optimal
equilibrium of the bargaining game without communication, reported in Proposition 1. In
both cases disputants play a separating equilibrium (except for the trivial case in which
q ≥ γ/(γ + 1) where peace is always achieved). So, in both equilibria, players reveal their
types by means of their choices. But in the crisis bargaining game without cheap talk, this
information is revealed only after demands are made, whereas with unmediated cheap talk,
the information is shared before the demands are made. Intuitively, sharing information
before demands are made allows the players to use this information more efficiently in the
crisis bargaining game. In fact, unmediated peace talks induce a strict improvement in the
probability of peace for q < γ/(γ+1). Specifically, when γ/(γ+2) ≤ q < γ/(γ+1) and both
players are hawk, peace talks turn the sure event of war (under the game without talks)
into one in which peace occurs with positive probability. Similarly, when q < γ/(γ + 2),
war takes place with probability one in asymmetric hawk dove dyads, in the equilibrium
of Proposition 1, but with probability smaller than one when unmediated peace talks are
introduced.
We now proceed to describe the militarization strategies in the augmented game with
unmediated peace talks, given that the players coordinate on the equilibria reported in
Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 In the augmented game with unmediated bilateral peace talks, given the
solution in Proposition 3, the disputants cannot improve on the grim outcome in which
they both arm with probability q = 1, and then fight, for any k ∈ [0, k̄].
Hence, for k ∈ (k∗, k̄), the expectation of unmediated peace talks induces more militariza-
tion, and lower peace chance, than in the equilibrium of the game without communication.
For k ≤ k∗, the equilibrium incentives are the same with and without unmediated peace
talks.
In sharp contrast with the benchmark case without communication, unmediated peace
talks do not improve on the grim outcome in arming and fighting are certain, for the
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relevant range [0, k̄] of the cost parameter k. Hence, for any k ∈ (k∗, k̄), unmediated peace
talks may induce negative incentives for militarization and reduce the peace chance as well
as overall welfare. The intuition for this seemingly perverse result is simple. Taking the
probability that each nation is strong as given, cheap talk improves the chance for peaceful
crisis resolutions, by reducing the probability of wasteful war when both nations are hawks
(without any change in the hawks payoffs when they meet doves). This increases the payoff
for nations to become strong, and thus in equilibrium nations arm with higher probability.
Thus, although it is true that communication can improve the chances for peace when
the militarization decisions are ignored, an analysis that captures how expectations of the
bargaining process will unfold illustrates that this channel to improved negotiations creates
particularly strong incentives for militarization and the latter effect dominates.
3 Third party intervention
We have shown that bilateral unmediated communication, while reducing the risk of conflict
in ongoing crises, may yield more militarization and more destructive crises. We now show
that there exist forms of third party interventions that do not suffer from these drawbacks.
In fact, it is possible to avoid the militarization incentives mentioned above if the crises
are expected to be dealt with by some kind of third party intervention, even if this third
party has no enforcement power and still relies on the same information that is available
with unmediated peace talks. That is, the third party has no special access to the private
information of the two sides. This section establishes that there exist forms of mediation
that change the communication incentives of players in a way that the crisis resolution
objectives do not create the same militarization incentives created by the expectation of
direct communication.
Optimal Mediation, Given Militarization We consider a type of procedural medi-
ation that is often studied in mechanism design. We consider the case with a neutral or
“honest broker” mediator who does not favor either of the disputants. Examples of such
mediators might be Nobel Peace Prize winners like Martti Ahtisaari and Jimmy Carter, or
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Nongovernmental Organizations like the International Crisis Group. The mediator has a
mandate, or a preference, to minimize the probability of war when the international crisis
erupts, after the militarization stage. That is, we assume our mediators have a narrow man-
date to resolve the current conflict and do not take into account the incentives of disputants
who anticipate their mediation techniques when they choose whether to militarize before
negotiations. Indeed, it would not be realistic to presume that the mediator’s mandate
included deterring strategic choices that took place before their intervention in the crisis.
Rather, our mediator with her short-term mandate, takes the (symmetric) equilibrium mil-
itarization probability q as given, and tries to minimize the chance that this dispute ends
in war. This assumption mirrors our selection in the benchmark bargaining game and its
cheap-talk extension. There we focus on the best equilibria treating investment decisions
as fixed. Our mediator has the same characteristics.
Also note that the mediator is not endowed with unrealistic levels of “commitment
power” either. We assume that the mediator can commit to her proposal during the crisis,
and will not renegotiate if one or both nations reject her recommendation. This means that
we assume the mediator can quit and credibly refuse to broker any subsequent deals, leading
to escalation of conflict and war. We also assume that the disputants cannot broker their
own deals following the decision to reject the mediator’s offers. This mediation institution
is close to what mediation scholars call procedural mediation (Bercovitch,1997).
We suppose that the mediator does not have access to any privileged or private infor-
mation. She privately solicits unverifiable and costless messages from the disputants and
then makes settlement recommendations. What A and B tell the mediator is entirely up
to them. Upon hearing the settlement recommendation, the disputants, A and B, then
bargain on the split of the pie according to the same crisis bargaining game described in
the benchmark case above.
As in the previous section, we first derive the optimal solution of the bargaining game
with such a mediator, taking the militarization probability, q, as exogenous and then we
consider the induced equilibrium probability of arming.
Proposition 5 For any given militarization strategy q, the optimal equilibrium of a the
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crisis bargaining game with an unbiased mediator can be characterized by three parameters,
qH , qM , pM and described as follows: Each player truthfully reveals her arms level to the
mediator. Then, hawk dyads (H,H) coordinate on the peaceful demands (1/2, 1/2) with
probability qH , and fight with probability 1 − qH ; asymmetric dyads (H,L) coordinate on
the peaceful demands (pθ, 1 − pθ) with probability pM , on the demands (1/2, 1/2) with
probability qM and fight with probability 1− pM − qM — the case for (L,H) is symmetric;
and dove dyads (L,L) achieve peace with demands (1/2, 1/2) with probability one.
Specifically, when q ≤ γ/(γ + 2), qH = qM = 0, and pM ∈ (0, 1); when γ/(γ + 2) ≤ q <
γ/(γ + 1), pM + qM = 1, qH ∈ (0, 1) and qM ∈ (0, 1) ; and finally, when q ≥ γ/(γ + 1),
qM = 1, and qH = 1.
Whenever γ/(γ + 2) ≤ q < γ/(γ + 1), mediation improves the peace chance relative to
unmediated cheap talk. For all values of q, mediation yields at least as large chance of
peace as unmediated cheap talk.
The proposition illustrates that the optimal form of mediation involves some degree
of opaqueness, or obfuscation, in the mediator’s choice of recommendations.9 Specifically,
mediators optimally obfuscate hawks’ beliefs. In equilibrium, when a hawk receives rec-
ommendation (pθ, 1− pθ), she knows for sure that the opponent is a dove; whereas when
receiving recommendation (1/2, 1/2), the hawk is unsure about the opponent’s type. Me-
diators, importantly, sometimes take actions that make hawks believe their opponents are
also hawks. Specifically, when receiving the reports stating that one player is a hawk and
the other is a dove, the mediator recommends the symmetric split (1/2, 1/2) with proba-
bility qM , instead of the asymmetric splits (pθ, 1− pθ). This strategy is equivalent to not
revealing to a hawk that the opponent is a dove. We shall later see how this optimal me-
diation strategy, which minimizes the difference between the hawk’s and the dove’s utility
in the mediation game, leads to optimal incentives for militarization.
9A mediator who always truthfully relays the players’ reports cannot achieve a peace chance higher
than the peace chance achieved with unmediated direct peace talks.
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Mediation and Militarization We now build on the above result to solve for the mili-
tarization equilibrium probability q given that the ensuing dispute is solved via mediation.
The following result characterizes the equilibrium militarization and conflict probability.
Importantly, it shows that mediators looking to reach peaceful settlements in the current
crisis do not suffer from the drawbacks presented by unmediated bilateral peace talks.
Not only can a mediator improve the peace chance given militarization strategies q. Such
a mediator can also improve welfare in the whole game, which captures the “upstream”
militarization decisions.
Proposition 6 In the crisis bargaining game with a peace seeking mediator the best equi-
librium can be characterized as follows: For any militarization cost k, there is a unique









= γ/(γ + 2).10
Peace seeking mediators improve the chance of peace V and the welfare W with respect to
unmediated peace talks, and to the benchmark double-auction without communication.
Remarkably, mediation improves the chances of peaceful dispute resolution without
creating negative distortions to the militarization decisions. The key to understanding
how this is possible hinges on seeing how mediation differs from cheap-talk. Our mediator
can hide information that is in the open with direct cheap talk. Specifically, it may hide
information so as to make nations that arms more concerned about the strength of their
opponent than those who choose not to arm. This makes a militarized nation willing
to accept a less attractive settlement and lowers the overall expected payoff to arming
(compared to cheap talk). As a consequence, nations are less willing to invest resources in
militarization than when the expect the crisis to be settled by direct bilateral negotiations.
As a result, the probability of being strong is lower in equilibrium, and the probability of
war given any profile of militarization levels is no higher in the best mediated equilibrium
than in the best cheap talk equilibrium (it is also no higher than in the benchmark without
communication).
10The explicit formula for the mixing probability is cumbersome, and relegated to the appendix.
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A more formal intuition can be grasped by noting that, given any dispute resolution
institution, the equilibrium probability q of strategic militarization is given by
q =
U(H,L)− U(L,L)
U(H,L)− U(L,L) + U (L,H)− U(H,H)
, (1)
where U(tA, tB) is player A’s expected payoff in the dispute, when the players’ types are
tA and tB. Hence, the equilibrium militarization strategy q increases in U(H,L)−U(L,L),
the gain for being a hawk instead of a dove, when facing a dove. Similarly, q decreases
in U (L,H) − U(H,H), the loss for being a hawk instead of a dove, when facing a hawk.
Peace seeking mediation penalizes choosing to be a hawk more than bilateral and direct
cheap talk, i.e., it makes U(H,L)−U(L,L) smaller and U (L,H)−U(H,H) larger. Hence,
it makes the militarization strategy q smaller in equilibrium.
The Institutional Optimality of Mediation Recall that when a mediator is called in
a dispute, her mandate is usually set within the boundaries of the dispute. The objective
of preventing disputes and militarization is not realistically part of her commitment and to
a large degree the militarization decision of the current parties to the dispute were made
in the past. The success of the mediator’s efforts are likely judged solely on the basis of
how the current dispute is resolved.
But as we have seen because an institution (bilateral diplomacy or mediation) can
effectively reduce the risk of war in the ongoing dispute, it may paradoxically incentivize
arming, thus ultimately raise the risk of war. This concern mirrors the perverse effect of
unmediated bilateral communication above.
We just showed that peace seeking mediation does not suffer from this drawback: it
improves the chances of peaceful dispute resolution without creating negative militarization
distortions. SO while the exact nature of the bargaining or mediation protocol will likely
have affects on exact settlements, the probability of war, and the chance of peace, in general
there should be a difference in militarization strategies across crises conditional on observed
dispute settlement techniques. In fact, empirically, this is sometimes the case. For example,
looking at the data from Svensson’s (2007) study on the effects of direct negotiations and
mediation on agreements in all intrastate armed conflicts between 1989 and 2003, one finds
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that if you compare the size of government armies in crises with just bilateral negotiations
to those with a mediator the first category averages 273,901 troops versus when a mediator
is used it is only 124,277. A simple t-test rejects the hypothesis on no difference in these
case at better than a .001 level.
Next, we will now show something much stronger, peace seeking mediation achieves
the same welfare as a hypothetical optimal third party intervention mechanism, in which
the third party has the broader mandate to commit to ‘punish’ nations for militarizing and
entering a dispute in the first place. That is, a mediator with the mandate to consider total
welfare, and balance long-term militarization incentives and short-run fighting incentives,
can do no better than the short-sighted peace seeking mediator.
Such far-sighted institution is not likely available in the real world, and it serves only
as benchmark to assess how much is lost by the narrow mandate. We only maintain the
assumption that the optimal institution is budget balanced: That is, it cannot bribe or
punish the players to force them to settle.
Theorem 1 Although peace seeking mediators may not take into account the incentives that
they create for strategic militarization, they are an optimal institution in the militarization
game, both in terms of arms reduction and peace chance maximization, among all budget-
balanced institutions.
An intuitive description of the proof of Theorem 1 may be obtained by considering
equation (1) again. Recall from Proposition 5 that, under optimal mediation, (i) dove
pairs never fight, (ii) the settlement (pθ, 1− pθ) is chosen so as to keep the payoff of hawks
meeting doves as low as possible, and (iii) hawk pairs are more likely to fight than any
other type pair. Hence, she minimizes the incentives of a weak nation to pretend that
it is strong. As an unintended consequence, she also minimizes the incentives for a weak
nation to become strong. That is, peace seeking mediation minimizes U(H,L) − U(L,L)
and maximizes U (L,H) − U(H,H), among all budget-balanced institutions. Hence, she
keeps the upstream incentives to arm in check, and minimizes strategic militarization q in
equilibrium. In other words, such a mediator induces the same militarization incentives as
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the hypothetical institution whose mandate includes deterring militarization which took
place before the eruption of the crisis. Because, by construction, the mediator’s strategy in
Proposition 5 maximizes the chance of peace given any militarization strategy q, the fact
that it also minimizes the equilibrium militarization probability implies that it maximizes
the overall disputants’ welfare, among all budget-balanced institutions.
4 Conclusion
This paper pushes for scholars of conflict to broaden their field of vision in thinking about
institutions. How nations negotiate can affect more than whether the crisis at hand is
resolved peacefully; the institution can have pronounced affects on the types of conflicts
that are likely to emerge by shaping the incentive for nations to militarize. Our results
show that not all forms of conflict resolution are equal. In particular, there are at least two
dimensions upon which the conflict reducing effects of an institution should be considered.
First is what we may call the short-run effect. The short-run effect is how a particular type
of dispute resolution procedure–like a summit to enable bilateral peace talks or a mediated
third party intervention–might increase the chance of peace today. From the short-run
perspective direct peace talks look like they generate a significant benefit to all parties
looking to avoid war. For every possible configuration of parameters the best cheap talk
equilibrium has less conflict then the best equilibrium from the bargaining game without
cheap talk.
In the bigger picture, however, there is a second effect we may call the long-run effect.
The long-run effect is how the method of conflict resolution changes incentives to milita-
rize and, therefore, shapes the types of conflict that arise. We show that which dispute
resolution mechanism an actor expects to face can matter. Specifically when the cost of
arming is low, but not too low, the equilibrium level of strategic arming generates a positive
probability of peace when there is no direct communication, but war for sure when peace
talks are expected. Mediation, on the other hand, improves the probability of peace in
both the long and the short run. These changes in the probability of war result from how
expected peace settlements change the expected payoffs to actors with different levels of
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arms making some strategies in the short run game untenable when the players strengths
are a function of their militarization strategies.
Our analysis depends on a number of assumptions, like that there are two possible
levels of arms, that uncertainty is about the strength of players as opposed to their costs
or preference for fighting, and that the mediator can commit to allowing war if her offer is
rejected. The assumptions are important for our analysis and the construction of equilibria
to this crisis analysis, but they are not crucial to our general point. We chose to analyze
bilateral cheap talk communication and mediation because they are often studied in the
conflict literature and represent seemingly similar ways to facilitate peace. The fact that
they obtain peace in ways that are subtly distinct, but have decidedly different affects on
upstream incentives suggests that this line of reasoning needs to be expanded.
Beyond broadening the focus of theoretical work on institutions to a study of short and
long run incentives, this paper makes an important contribution to our understanding of
communication and bargaining. Although the point must be developed within the context
of a series of formal papers, the central conclusion transcends this approach and provides
a logic about what makes third-party intervention potentially valuable. A series of paper
going back to at least Kydd (2003) focus on the question of whether mediation can improve
on direct communication. At the heart of this debate is whether there is value in a mediator
with no independent private information and no ability to create external incentives. In
the case of private values the answer is no (Fey and Ramsay 2010) but in the context of
interdependent values the answer is yes (Horner Morelli Squintani, 2010). In this paper we
have focused on how mediated and unmediated communication can differ as the latter need
not created distortions to militarization whereas the latter does. The difference hinges on
the ability of a mediator to selectively shape the beliefs players assign to their opponent
being a hawk at the time that they must accept or reject an offer on the table. In settings
with interdependent values this belief is important as it influences what a Hawk will accept.
But in settings with private values the type of the other nation is not payoff relevant and
thus the ability to influence this belief buys a mediator nothing. One take away of this is a
better understanding of what makes a mediator effective – the ability to obfuscate by being
20
willing to sometimes let the participants fight when alternative settlements are possible –
, and when such attributes can have the most value – when the uncertainty is about a
common-values component. There is scope for improvement over direct communication
by the disputants if a third-party has the stomach to sometimes stop short of brokering
a settlement. This tendency, while seemingly counterproductive, can result in a type of
obfuscation that ultimately discourages the very militarization that raises the risk of costly
war-fighting in the first place.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First, note that for qθ/2 + (1− q) pθ ≤ 1/2, or q ≥ γ/ (γ + 1) ,
both doves and hawks can achieve peace by coordinating on the claims xA = xB = 1/2.
When q < γ/ (γ + 1) , it is impossible that hawk dyads achieve peace. But it is possible
to achieve peace for all other type dyads, as long as the hawk’s claim is compatible with
an opponent dove’s demand. This is achieved by setting xL + xH = 1, so that peace can
be achieved in equilibrium. Also, a hawk must prefer to demand xH rather than triggering
war against a dove by making a higher demand (if meeting a hawk, the demand will result
in war anyway). Hence, we need that xH ≥ pθ. Further, a dove must prefer to post
her demand xL rather than triggering war with a hawk, but collecting a higher share of
the pie with a dove, by making the demand 1 − xL. This requirement translates in the
following inequality: (1− q) /2 + qxL ≥ (1− q) (1− xL) + q (1− p) θ. Bringing together
these conditions, we obtain the condition that q ≥ γ/ (γ + 2) . When this condition fails,
it is impossible to achieve peace for mixed hawk-dove dyads. As a result, only dove dyads
will achieve peace, by making compatible claims xL = 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 2. We calculate the equilibrium militarization strategy q given
the solution of the crisis bargaining game in Proposition 1.
We first search for completely mixed strategies, i.e., we impose the indifference condition
IL (q) = IH (q)− k;
where IL (q) and IH (q) are the interim payoffs of doves and hawks respectively.
On the basis of Proposition 1, there are two cases to consider.
Case 1, q ≤ γ/ (γ + 2) Here, peace is only achieved by dove dyads, and so:
IL (q) = q(1− p)θ + (1− q)/2
IH (q) = qθ/2 + (1− q)pθ.








which is an increasing expression in q, such that k (0) = pθ − 1/2.
Case 2. γ/ (γ + 2) < q ≤ γ/ (γ + 1) . Here, only hawk dyads result in war. Because
xH = pθ and xL = 1− pθ, we obtain:
IL (q) = q(1− pθ) + (1− q)/2
IH (q) = qθ/2 + (1− q)pθ.
Solving the indifference condition yields:
k (λ) = (1− θ) γ − λ(1− γ)
2 (λ+ 1)
,
which is a decreasing function in λ such that k+ (γ/2) = (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
< k− (γ/2) =
(γ+3)γ
2(γ+2)
(1− θ) and k (γ) = (1− θ) γ2
2(γ+1)
. Inverting the expression k (λ) , and changing vari-
able to q, we obtain:
q (k) = γ − 2k
1− θ
Hence, we obtain that for k ∈ [0, (1− θ) γ2
2(γ+1)
), there is no completely mixed strategy
equilibrium q.
For k ∈ [(1− θ) γ2
2(γ+1)
, (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
], the unique completely mixed strategy equilibrium
q (k) = γ− 2k












For k ∈ ((1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
, (1− θ) γ
2
), there is no completely mixed strategy equilibrium q.
Considering that, for k ≥ (1− θ) γ
2
, there is a pure strategy equilibrium, in which q = 0,
we can disregard case 1, which yields higher militarization probability and lower welfare.
Now consider pure-strategies. Suppose that q = 0, then IL (q) = 1/2 and IH (q) =
pθ.Hence, q = 0 is an equilibrium if and only if k ≥ pθ− 1/2 = (1− θ) γ
2
. In the remaining
region, k < (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
, the ‘grim’ equilibrium, in which disputants arm and then fight
is the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. In order to prove this result, we first reformulate the problem by
substituting the last stage of the game, the double auction game, with the following, simpler,
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model. Given messages m = (mA,mB) , and the outcome of the public randomization
device, nature selects a split proposal x, and the players simultaneously choose whether to
agree to the pie division (x, 1− x).
It is evident that any outcome of this simpler model is also an equilibrium of our model.
Suppose, in fact, that the players agree to the split division (x, 1−x) in the simpler model.
Then, they can achieve the outcome (x, 1− x) in the double auction game, by making
demands xA = x and xB = 1− x.
Focusing on fully-separating equilibria, one can also establish the converse result, that
any equilibrium of our model (with the double auction game) is also an outcome of this
simpler model. In fact, when types fully separate at the cheap talk stage, each player’s
type is common knowledge in the double auction stage. Hence, in equilibrium, the players
know each other’s demands. Suppose that, in equilibrium, player A demands x. Player
B’s best response is either to demand 1 − x, or to trigger war with a higher demand.
Hence, either peace takes place with the split (x, 1− x) , or war occurs. Player B’s choice
of whether to trigger war or make the demand 1 − x follows exactly the same calculation
that she would make in the simpler model we introduced above, if nature selected the split
proposal (x, 1− x) . Because the same argument applies to player A, we have shown that
any fully-separating equilibrium of our model (with the double auction game) is also an
outcome of this simpler model.
Note, now, that pure-strategy equilibria of our model belong to two different categories:
pooling equilibria and fully-separating equilibria. Of course, the pooling equilibria coincide
with the equilibria of the game of conflict without peace talks. Hence, the solution of our
problem can be achieved by comparing the equilibria described in Proposition 1, with the
optimal (fully-separating) outcomes of the simpler game introduced in this proof, which are
fully characterized in Lemma 1 in Horner Morelli and Squintani (2010). These outcomes
are the one reported in the statement of Proposition 3. They induce a higher peace chance
than the equilibria described in Proposition 1, because it is the case that pH > 0, when
γ/2 ≤ λ < γ, and that pM > 0, when λ < γ/2.
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Proof of Proposition 4 . In the notation of the separating equilibrium, for any given
militarization probability, the interim payoffs are:
IL (q) = q(pM(1− b) + (1− pM)(1− p)θ) + (1− q)/2
IH (q) = q(pH/2 + (1− pH)θ/2) + (1− q)(pMb+ (1− pM)pθ).
We search for completely mixed strategies, i.e., we impose that IL (q) = IH (q)− k. There
are two cases.
Case 1. λ ≤ γ/2. Substituting the solution described in Proposition 3 into the above
expressions, we obtain:
IL (q) = q
[
1









IH (q) = qθ/2 + (1− q)pθ.
Solving the indifference condition, and reparametrizing to get rid of p, q, we obtain the k
which makes the players indifferent for λ and γ and θ fixed:
k (λ) = (1− θ)
(
γ − λ+ λγ − 2λ2
)
(γ + 1)
2 (γ − 2λ+ 1) (λ+ 1)
Because 2λ ≤ γ, this is always positive.






(γ − 2λ+ 1)−2 (λ+ 1)−2 (γ − 4λ− 1) (γ + 1) (1− θ)
∝ γ − 4λ− 1
The expression is positive for λ < (γ − 1)/4 and negative for λ > (γ − 1)/4, on the
range λ ∈ [0, γ/2] . Then, we calculate the extremes of the range: k (0) = (1− θ) γ
2
and
k (γ/2) = (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
. This concludes that the function k (λ) equals (1− θ) γ
2
at λ = 0 to
then increase until λ = (γ − 1)/4 and then decrease until λ = γ/2 reaching (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
.
Noting that (1− θ) γ
2
> (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
> 0, we determine the following conclusions:
For [k ∈ (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
, (1− θ) γ
2
), there exists a unique equilibrium λ (k), the function
λ is strictly decreasing in k, it starts at λ = γ/2 for k = (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
and reaches λ (q) =
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0 for k = (1− θ) γ
2
. The explicit equilibrium solution is cumbersome, and its omission
inconsequential.
For k ∈ [0, (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
), there does not exist any equilibrium such that λ ≤ γ/2.
Case 2. λ ∈ [γ/2, γ). The interim payoffs are:
IL (q) = q(1− pθ) + (1− q)/2












Hence, the indifference condition yields:
k = (1− θ) (γ + 1) γ
2 (γ + 2)
,
which is constant in λ. So, for k = (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
, all λ ∈ [γ/2, γ) are an equilibrium, and
there is no completely mixed equilibrium for k < (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
.
Now consider pure-strategies. Suppose that q = 0, then IL (q) = 1/2 and IH (q) =
pθ.Hence, q = 0 is an equilibrium if and only if k ≥ pθ− 1/2 = (1− θ) γ
2
. In the remaining
region, k < (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
, the ‘grim’ equilibrium, in which disputants arm and then fight
is the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of this result consists in showing that the opti-
mal strategies of a Myerson mediator coincide with the optimal strategies of a mediator
characterized in Horner, Morelli, and Squintani (2010), Lemma 4.
The basic set up is the same in the two papers: There are two players, whose strength
can be high with probability q and of low with probability 1− q; if fighting, the payoffs are
(θ/2, θ/2) when players have the same strength, and pθ, (1−p)θ if the first player is stronger.
Unlike here, when modeling mediation in HMS, we directly appeal to the revelation prin-
ciple (Myerson, 1982) and restrict attention, without loss of generality, to direct revelation
mechanisms. In a direct revelation mechanism the players privately report their “types”, in
this case their realized level of militarization, to the mediator. Then, the mediator makes
a recommendation to the players, possibly randomizing across recommendations. In this
context, such a recommendation may also be to go to “war”. Furthermore, without loss of
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generality, we restricted attention to truthful equilibria of the direct and obedient revela-
tion mechanism, in which the mediators strategies are such that players reveal their types
truthfully to the mediator, and the mediator’s recommendation are obeyed by the players.
By the revelation principle we know that the ex-ante peace probability induced by any
mediation scheme, within the class of games described above, can also be achieved as the
truthful equilibrium of the game induced by the direct and obedient revelation mechanism.
For future reference, we here report the mediation program derived in HMS.
min
b,pH ,pM ,qM ,pL,qL
(1− 2pL − qL) (1− q)2 + (1− pM − qM) 2q (1− q) + (1− qH) q2
subject to the high-type ex post IR constraint
bpM ≥ pMpθ, (qqH + (1− q)qM) · 1/2 ≥ qqHθ/2 + (1− q)qMpθ,
to the low type ex post IR constraint
pLb ≥ pLθ/2, (qpM + (1− q)pL)(1− b) ≥ qpM(1− p)θ + (1− q)pLθ/2,
(qqM + (1− q)qL) · 1/2 ≥ qqM(1− p)θ + (1− q)qLθ/2,
to the high-type ex interim IC* constraint
q(qH/2 + (1− qH)θ/2) + (1− q)(pMb+ qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)pθ) ≥
max{(qpM + (1− q)pL)(1− b), qpMθ/2 + (1− q)pLpθ}+ max{(1− q)pLb, (1− q)pLpθ}
+ max{(qqM + (1− q)qL) · 1/2, qqMθ/2 + (1− q)qLpθ}
+q(1− pM − qM)θ/2 + (1− q)(1− 2pL − qL)pθ,
and to the low-type ex interim IC* constraint
q(pM(1− b) + qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)(1− p)θ)




max{(1− q)pMb, (1− q)pM
θ
2




+q(1− qH)(1− p)θ + q(1− pM − qM)θ/2,
To see that such an upper bound can be reached by Myerson mediation in our model,
it is sufficient to note that any truthful equilibrium achieved by the direct and obedient
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revelation mechanism is also an equilibrium of our Nash demand game augmented with a
Myerson mediator.
Suppose in fact that the mediator’s recommendation is for a peaceful split (x, 1− x)
of the pie, accepted by the players in the equilibrium of the game induced by the direct
revelation mechanism. Then, there is also an equilibrium of the Nash demand game in which
the players demand precisely xA = x and xB = 1−x, thus resolving the dispute peacefully.
And we have seen before that the crisis bargaining game always has war equilibria, to
reproduce the outcome of a “war recommendation” in the game induced by the direct
revelation mechanism. Hence, the direct revelation mechanism yields an upper bound for
the peace probability that mediation can achieve in the Nash demand game augmented
with a Myerson mediator.
This concludes that the optimal strategies of a Myerson mediator coincide with the
optimal strategies of a mediator characterized in Horner, Morelli, and Squintani (2010),
Lemma 4 which states that, for any fixed q, the specific values of the control variables are:
• For q ≤ γ/(γ + 2), b = pθ, qL = 1, qH = qM = 0, pM = 1−q(γ+1)(1−q)−2q .
• For γ
γ+2
≤ q < γ
γ+1









• For q ≥ γ
γ+1
, b = pθ, qL = 1, qM = 1, and qH = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider the Myerson mediation game. The expected equi-
librium payoffs of a hawk and dove before they report their type to the mediator are,
respectively:
IL (q) = q(pM(1− pθ) + qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)(1− p)θ) + (1− q)/2; (2)
IH (q) = q(qH/2 + (1− qH)θ/2) + (1− q)(pMpθ + qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)pθ). (3)
Hence, at the beginning of the game, the payoff for militarizing is IH (q)− k, whereas the
payoff for remaining dove is IL (q) . An equilibrium with full militarization, q = 1, exists
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when IH (1) − k ≥ IL (1) ; likewise, an equilibrium with no militarization, q = 0, exists
when IL (0) ≥ IH (0) − k; whereas an equilibrium with mixed militarization strategy q
exists when IL (q) = IH (q)− k.
When k > pθ − 1/2, the unique symmetric equilibrium is q = 0. In fact, for all q,
IL (q)− IH (q) + k
= q(pM(1− pθ) + qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)(1− p)θ) + (1− q)/2
− (q(qH/2 + (1− qH)θ/2) + (1− q)(pMpθ + qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)pθ)) + k
> q(pM(1− pθ) + qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)(1− p)θ) + (1− q)/2
























if γ/2 ≤ λ < γ
1−θ
2










γ−λ+1λ if γ/2 ≤ λ < γ
1−θ
2
γ if λ ≥ γ.
These quantities are all positive.
So, suppose that k ≤ pθ−1/2 = (1−θ)γ/2. We now search for mixed strategy equilibria.
The indifference condition is:
IL (q) + k = IH (q)
Case 1. λ ≤ γ/2. Substituting the mediator’s solution into the expressions (2) and (3), we
obtain:
IL (q) = q
[
1









IH (q) = qθ/2 + (1− q)pθ.
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Solving the indifference condition, and reparametrizing to get rid of p, q, we obtain the k
which makes the players indifferent for λ and γ and θ fixed:
k (λ) = (1− θ)
(
γ − λ+ λγ − 2λ2
)
(γ + 1)
2 (γ − 2λ+ 1) (λ+ 1)
Because 2λ ≤ γ, this is always positive.






(γ − 2λ+ 1)−2 (λ+ 1)−2 (γ − 4λ− 1) (γ + 1) (1− θ)
∝ γ − 4λ− 1
The expression is positive for λ < (γ − 1)/4 and negative for λ > (γ − 1)/4, on the range
λ ∈ [0, γ/2] . Then, we calculate the extremes of the range:
k (0) = (1− θ) γ
2
and k (γ/2) = (1− θ) (γ + 1) γ
2 (γ + 2)
.
This concludes that the function k (λ) equals (1− θ) γ
2
at λ = 0 to then increase until λ =
(γ − 1)/4 and then decrease until λ = γ/2 reaching (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)





> 0, we determine the following conclusions:
• For [k ∈ (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
, (1− θ) γ
2
), there exists a unique equilibrium λ (k), the function
λ is strictly decreasing in k, it starts at λ = γ/2 for k = (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
and reaches
λ (q) = 0 for k = (1− θ) γ
2
.
• For k ∈ [0, (1− θ) (γ+1)γ
2(γ+2)
), there does not exist any equilibrium such that λ ≤ γ/2.
The explicit equilibrium solution is cumbersome, and its omission inconsequential.
Case 2. For γ ≥ λ ≥ γ/2, substituting the mediator’s solution in the expressions
IL (q) = q
[(
1− 2λ− γ
γ(γ + 1− λ)
)
(1− pθ) + 2λ− γ
2γ(γ + 1− λ)
]
+ (1− q)/2
IH (q) = q
[
2λ− γ



















Again, solving for the indifference condition and reparametrizing, we obtain
k (λ) = (1− θ) (γ − λ) (γ + 1)
2 (γ − λ+ 1)
,
or
q = (1 + γ)
2k − γ(1− θ)
2k(2 + γ)− (1 + γ)2 (1− θ)
this is again always positive.





(λ− γ − 1)−2 (γ + 1) (1− θ) < 0.
Calculating it at the two extremes λ = γ/2 and λ = γ, we obtain:




, and k (γ) = 0.
This concludes that, for k ∈
[





, there is a unique mixed strategy equilib-
rium λ (k), with γ/2 ≤ λ ≤ γ, the function λ (k) is strictly decreasing, it starts at λ = γ





Wrapping up the two cases, we conclude that there is a unique mixed strategy equi-
librium λ∗ (k). It is strictly decreasing in k for k ∈
[
0, (1− θ) γ
2
]






= 0, for k > (1− θ) γ
2
, λ (k) = 0.
Turning to check for pure-strategy equilibria, we first suppose that q = λ = 0, then
IL (q) = 1/2 and IH (q) = pθ. Hence, for k ≤ pθ − 1/2, λ = 0 is not an equilibrium.
Then, suppose that q = 1. The mediator’s solution is to assign qL = qM = qH = 1, so that
the split 1/2 is always assigned regardless of the reports. Hence, the interim payoffs are
IL (q) = 1/2 = IH (q) . So, becoming hawk with probability one is never an equilibrium.
This result completes the proof of Proposition 6. 
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove this result, we first show a useful Lemma that compares
the symmetric equilibrium militarization probability in the arbitration dispute resolution
solution of HMS, with the mediation HMS dispute resolution solution. The arbitration
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dispute resolution in HMS is formulated as mediation, with the only difference that players
must commit to agree to the third party recommendation, before such recommendations are
made. In other terms, the arbitrator is capable of enforcing its recommendation, whereas
the mediator’s recommendations need to be self enforcing.
Formally, the HMS arbitration program is formalized as follows:
min
b,pL,pM ,pH
(1− q)2 (1− pL) + 2q (1− q) (1− pM) + q2 (1− pH)
subject to ex interim individual rationality (for the hawk and dove, respectively)
(1− q) (pMb+ (1− pM) pθ) + q (pH/2 + (1− pH) θ/2) ≥ (1− q) pθ + qθ/2,
(1− q) (pL/2 + (1− pL) θ/2) + q (pM (1− b) + (1− pM) (1− p) θ) ≥ (1− q) θ/2 + q (1− p) θ,
and to the ex interim incentive compatibility constraints (for the hawk and dove, respec-
tively)
(1− q) ((1− pM)pθ + pMb) + q ((1− pH)θ/2 + pH/2) ≥
(1− q) ((1− pL)pθ + pL/2) + q ((1− pM)θ/2 + pM(1− b)) ,
(1− q) ((1− pL)θ/2 + pL/2) + q ((1− pM)(1− p)θ + pM(1− b)) ≥
(1− q) ((1− pM)θ/2 + pMb) + q ((1− pH)(1− p)θ + pH/2) .
Lemma 1 The arbitration dispute resolution solution of HMS yields the same symmetric
equilibrium militarization probability as the mediation HMS dispute resolution solution.
Proof For any γ (including γ < 1), HMS show that the arbitration solution is:
1. For λ ≤ γ/2, b = 1
2
(γ(1− θ) + 1), pL = 1, pM = 1γ−2λ+1 , pH = 0;




The militarization strategy q in the arbitration game is given by the indifference condi-
tion:
IL (q) = (1− q) ((1− pM)pθ + pMb) + q ((1− pH)θ/2 + pH/2)
= (1− q) ((1− pL)θ/2 + pL/2) + q ((1− pM)(1− p)θ + pM(1− b))− k = IH (q)− k.(4)
Substituting the above solutions in the indifference condition, we find the expressions:
k (λ) = (1− θ)
(
γ − λ+ λγ − 2λ2
)
(γ + 1)
2 (γ − 2λ+ 1) (λ+ 1)
, for λ ≤ γ/2, (5)
k (λ) = (1− θ) (γ − λ) (γ + 1)
2 (γ − λ+ 1)
, for γ/2 < λ ≤ γ, (6)
which correspond to the solutions for the militarization game with the HMS optimal me-
diation solution (for any γ, including γ < 1). 
As a consequence of the above Lemma, we can prove the Theorem simply by showing
that the HMS arbitration solution achieves the same outcome as our hypothetical institution
that includes militarization deterrence in its objectives. In fact, we prove a stronger result.
We show that the HMS arbitration solution achieves the same welfare as a hypothetical
institution that not inly aims to keep militarization in check, but is even capable of enforce
its recommendations. Such an institution is represented by the following program. Let the
dove and hawk interim expected utilities be, respectively,
IL = q(pM(1− pθ) + qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)(1− p)θ) + (1− q)/2
IH = q(qH/2 + (1− qH)θ/2) + (1− q)(pMpθ + qM/2 + (1− pM − qM)pθ).
The optimal institution chooses q, b, pL, pM and pH so as to solve the program
min
q,b,pL,pM ,pH
(1− q)2 (1− pL + pLθ)+2q (1− q) (1− pM + pMθ − k)+q2 (1− pH + pHθ − 2k)
subject to the ex-ante obedience constraints:
q (1− q) [IH − k − IL] = 0, q[IH − k − IL] ≥ 0, (1− q) [IH − k − IL] ≤ 0
to the ex interim individual rationality (for the hawk and dove, respectively)
IH ≥ (1− q) pθ + qθ/2,
IL ≥ (1− q) θ/2 + q (1− p) θ,
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and to the ex interim incentive compatibility constraints (for the hawk and dove, respec-
tively)
IH ≥ (1− q) ((1− pL)pθ + pL/2) + q ((1− pM)θ/2 + pM(1− b)) ,
IL ≥ (1− q) ((1− pM)θ/2 + pMb) + q ((1− pH)(1− p)θ + pH/2) .
In order to proceed with the proof, we distinguish two parts. We first show that HMS
arbitrators achieve the same peace chance as the optimal institution define above. Then,
we show that they achieve the same militarization probability minimization as the optimal
institution. The analysis holds for any γ, including the case γ < 1.
To tackle the first problem, we set up the following relaxed problem which describes
necessary constraints satisfied by the hypothetical optimal institution defined above. We
choose {b, pL, pM , pH , q} so as to minimize the war probability
W = (1− q)2 (1− pL) + 2q (1− q) (1− pM) + q2 (1− pH)
subject to hawk ex interim individual rationality constraint
(1− q) (pMb+ (1− pM) pθ) + q (pH/2 + (1− pH) θ/2) ≥ (1− q) pθ + qθ/2,
to the dove ex interim incentive compatibility constraint
(1− q) ((1− pL)θ/2 + pL/2) + q ((1− pM)(1− p)θ + pM(1− b)) ≥
(1− q) ((1− pM)θ/2 + pMb) + q ((1− pH)(1− p)θ + pH/2) .
and to the militarization indifference condition (4).
To solve the relaxed problem, we first solve b in the militarization indifference condition,
and substitute it in the hawk ex interim individual rationality constraint, and in the hawk
ex interim incentive compatibility constraint. Rearranging, they now take the forms:
H = k +
1
2
θ − kq − pθ − 1
2
qθ + pqθ +
1
2


















L = pθ − 1
2





qθpH − pθpM −
1
2
qθpM − pqθpH + pqθpM ≥ 0.
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Note now that W evidently decreases in pL, that L is independent of pL, and that ∂H/∂pL =
1
2
(q − 1)2 (1− θ) > 0. Because setting pL = 1 makes W as small as possible without
violating the constraints H and L, it has to be part of the solution.
Substituting pL = 1 in W, H, and L, we obtain:
H = k − q − kq − pθ + 1
2

















L = pθ − 1
2





qθpH − pθpM −
1
2
qθpM − pqθpH + pqθpM ,
W = 2q (1− q) (1− pM) + q2 (1− pH) .
Now, we observe that ∂L/∂pH = −θq (p− 1/2) < 0 that ∂L/∂pM = −θ (p− 1/2) (1− q) <
0, and that L = −k when pM = 1 and pH = 1. Because W decreases in both pM and pH ,
this concludes that the dove incentive compatibility constraint must bind.
We now solve for pM in the constraint L = 0 and substitute it in the expressions for W
and H. We obtain
W = q2pH +K1 (p, θ, q, k)
H = −1
2
q2 (1− θ) pH +K2 (p, θ, q, k) ,
where the explicit formulas of K1 and K2 are inessential. Because W increases in pH and
H decreases in pH , this concludes that the constraint H = 0 must bind, unless pH = 0
(which does not matter, as it is part of the HMS arbitration solution).
Solving pH in the hawk ex interim individual rationality constraint, and substituting




(2kq − 2k + 2pθ + qθ − 2pqθ − 1) .




2pθ − θ − 2k
1− θ
≥ 2pθ − θ − (2pθ − 1)
1− θ
= 1 > 0.
Hence, the minimization of W under the constraints that H = 0, L = 0, 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1,
0 ≤ pH ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 is equivalent to the minimization of q subject to the constraints
that H = 0, L = 0, 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pH ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
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Note now that setting q = 0 together withH = 0 and L = 0 yields pH =
1
0
θ (2p− 1) (2pθ − 2k − 1)→
+∞, because θ (2p− 1) (2pθ − 2k − 1) ≥ 0 when k ≤ pθ − 1/2. Hence, the solution must
have an interior q.
We are now ready to show that the minimal value of q subject to the constraints that
H = 0, L = 0, 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ pH ≤ 1 is exactly the equilibrium value of q in the
militarization game, assuming that disputes are solved with the HMS optimal arbitration
solution. In order to do so, we take the following approach. We first reparametrize all
expressions in λ = q/ (1− q) and γ = (2pθ − 1) / (1− q) . Then, we prove that, for every
λ, the minimal value of k subject to the constraints that H = 0, L = 0, 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1,
and 0 ≤ pH ≤ 1 coincides with the expressions (5) and (6) obtained when solving the
militarization indifference condition (4) after plugging in the HMS optimal arbitration
solution. Because the expressions for k (λ) in (5) and (6) are strictly decreasing in λ, this
concludes that the inverse function k−1 (k) = λ identifies the minimal q subject to the
constraints that H = 0, L = 0, 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ pH ≤ 1, via the increasing relation
q/ (1− q) = λ.
So, reparametrizing the expressions for H and L, setting both of them equal to zero,
and solving for k and pH as a function of pM , we obtain
pH =
(2λpM − pM − γpM + 1)
(γ − λ+ 1)λ
(7)




λpM − λγ − γ + λ2
)
(γ + 1)
(γ + 1− λ) (λ+ 1)
. (8)
Because k decreases in pM for all λ < γ, we want to set pM as large as possible. When
pM = 1, pH =
(2λ−γ)
(γ−λ+1)λ , which is positive if and only if λ > γ/2.






γ − λ+ λγ − 2λ2 + λ2pH
)
(γ + 1)
(γ − 2λ+ 1) (λ+ 1)
. (9)
For λ < γ/2, it is the case that γ − 2λ+ 1 > 0, and hence this expression increases in pH .
We thus set pH = 0 and it is easy to verify that pM =
1
γ−2λ+1 ∈ (0, 1) .
Because we have recovered the HMS optimal arbitration solution, the part of the proof
concerning peace chance is concluded.
41
We now turn to show that HMS arbitrators are the optimal mechanism in terms of
militarization probability minimization, and achieve the same militarization probability as
the optimal institution defined at the beginning of this proof. Our proof approach will be




q s.t. H = 0, L = 0, IH − k = IL (10)
In order to do so, we first reparametrize all constraints in λ = q/ (1− q) and γ = (2pθ − 1) / (1− q) .
Then, we prove that, for every λ, the minimal value of k (λ) = IH − IL subject to the con-
straints 0 ≤ pL ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pM ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pH ≤ 1, H = 0 and L = 0 coincides with the
expressions (5) and (6). Because these expressions strictly decrease in λ, the same reason-
ing as in the previous part of the proof then concludes that the problem (10) is solved by
the HMS optimal arbitration solution.
So, we first differentiate k (λ) = IH − IL with respect to pL, and obtain the negative
derivative −1
2
(1− q) (1− θ) . Because we know that ∂H/∂pL > 0 and ∂L/∂pL = 0, min-
imization of k (λ) requires setting pL = 1. Then, we note that ∂k (λ) /∂b > 0, whereas
∂H/∂b > 0, and hence the constraint H = 0 must bind. Then, we see that ∂k (λ) /∂pM =







≤ 0. This, together with ∂L/∂pM = −θ (p− 1/2) (1− q) < 0 implies
that L binds.
Solving for pH and b in the constraints H = 0, L = 0, after imposing pL = 1, and
substituting the results in k (λ) , we again obtain the expressions (7) and (8), so that we
conclude that for λ > γ/2, the solution is pM = 1, pH =
(2λ−γ)
(γ−λ+1)λ . Likewise, solving for
pH and b in the constraints H = 0, L = 0, after imposing pL = 1, and substituting the
results in k (λ) , we obtain expression (9), and conclude that the solution is pH = 0 and
pM =
1
γ−2λ+1 ∈ (0, 1) , for λ < γ/2.
Because we have recovered the HMS optimal arbitration solution, also the part of the
proof concerning militarization probability is concluded. 
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